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Corporations-Short-Swing Profits: Proposal To Treat
Purchase Options as Equity Securities, Creating Two
Separate Holding Periods for Section 16(b) Purposes
B. T. Babbitt, Inc., instituted a suit against its president under
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 to recover
profits realized by him from various stock transactions. The transactions were as follows: 1) On 12/16/57 defendant obtained an
option to buy 10,000 shares of Babbitt common stock at $3.44375
per share. The option was not exercisable until 12/4/58, at which
time the market price of the stock was $9.3125 per share. 2) On
4/30/58 defendant purchased 591.06 shares of Babbitt preferred
stock at $40 per share. Each share was convertible into 8.9 shares
of common, until 6/30/59. 3) On 11/5/58, when the market price
of the common stock was $8.6875 per share, defendant converted
the preferred stock into 4,846 shares of common. 4) On 3/6/59
defendant sold 4,600 shares of common at $8.625 per share. 5) On
3/13/59 defendant exercised the option referred to in transaction
1) above, purchasing 10,000 shares of common at $3.44375 per
share. 6) On 5/6/59 defendant sold 5,749 shares of common at
$9.7945 per share.
The district court matched the fifth transaction, the March
13, 1959 exercise of the option - measuring the cost at the option
price - with the fourth transaction, the March 6, 1959 sale, to find
a short-swing profit of $23,833.75. The third transaction, the
November 5, 1958 conversion - measuring the cost as the market
value of common on that date - was matched with the sixth
transaction, the May 6, 1959 sale, giving a short-swing profit of
$6,360.37. On appeal the Second Circuit rejected both these
pairings, holding that the March 13th exercise of the option but with the cost measured by the fair market value of the
stock on the date the option was first exercisable (12/4/58)
rather than the option price - should have been matched with
the May 6th sale, giving a short-swing profit of only $2,771.02;
and that no other transactions resulted in any short-swing profit
to defendant B. T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d
Cir. 1964).
1. 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
2. Defendant also argued that SEC Rule X-16b-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3
(1960), which exempted nontransferable employee options from section 16(b),
immunized the transactions from any liability. Since Perlman v. Timberlake,
172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y.), decided on March 26, 1959, had declared the rule
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Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is intended to curtail the unscrupulous use of inside information for
individual profit by officers, directors, and large shareholders of
corporations. It provides for recovery by the corporation of all
profits realized from any purchase and sale or any sale and purchase of a corporation's stock within a six-month period by an
officer, director, or stockholder holding 10 percent or more of the
corporation's stock.4 Because of the inherent difficulty in proving
an insider's motive or expectation, section 16(b) applies irrespective of the presence or absence of any speculative intent at the
time of the purchase or sale.' Similarly, good faith conduct and
lack of actual inside information are not valid defenses.'
All possible short-swing profits accruing to insiders are recoverable by the corporation under section 16(b) .7 The measure of
profit recoverable is derived by matching the cost of stock purchased at the lowest price with that sold at the highest price
during any six-month period.8 A complex series of transactions
makes application of this seemingly simple formula difficult.
Furthermore, the Babbitt case requires consideration of what
constitutes a purchase and a sale, at what price they are to be
measured, and what is an "equity security" within section 16(b).
The conversion of the preferred shares into common constituted a purchase of the common at its market price on the November 5th conversion date within the accepted construction of
invalid as to purchases of common stock -by exercise of the option, the court
rejected the defense of good faith reliance on the rule for the May 6, 1959
sale. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, & 23(a), as amended, 49 Stat. 1379
(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1958).
3. See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934). See also Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959); Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217 F. Supp.
671, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1964); Yourd, Trading
in Securities by Directors, Officers, and Shareholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MrcH. L. REv. 133, 134 (1939).
4. See, e.g., Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y.

1951).
5. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100,
102 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), cause remanded,232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 831 (1957); Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, 78d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 15, at 6557 (1934); Yourd, supra note 3, at 133-34.
6. See, e.g., Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
7. Id. at 239.
8. Id. at 238-39. See generally 2 Loss, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 1062-66
(2d ed. 1961).
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section 16(b).' The only sale of common within six months of
this conversion

-

the fourth transaction

-

was at a lower price

than the conversion "purchase" price.o Therefore, the instant
court properly rejected the lower court's determination of a
short-swing profit based on the conversion." If the convertible
preferred had been purchased within six months of the conversion,
recovery of the difference between the cost of the preferred and
the value of the common into which it was converted would seem
appropriate. Since the conversion was a purchase of the common,
it should also be considered a sale of the preferred within section
16(b).12

The March 13th exercise of the option was also a purchase of
the common stock under prior decisions, 3 and this date is used
for determining the six-month period. In establishing the cost of
the common stock acquired, the instant court reversed the lower
court, and followed Steinberg v. Sharpe" finding the purchase
price to be the fair market value of the stock on the date on which
the option was first exercisable.' 5 Using this value rather than
the option price permits the insider to retain the long-term increment in the value of the option, an increment representing com9. See Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947). But as to forced conversions, see Ferraiolo v. Newman,
259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
10. Since both parties had stipulated that there was no market for the
preferred on the date of conversion, 332 F.2d at 258, the court took the market
value of the common received on the date of conversion as the purchase price.
Had the preferred had an independent market value, the purchase price would
have been measured by this value. See Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, supra
note 9, at 989-90.
11. Even if a profit were realized by matching the November 5th conversion (or the March 13th exercise) with the March 6th sale, it would seem
that defendant would be immune from liability under SEC Rule X-16b-3.

See note 2 supra.
12. See Blau v. Lamb, 163 F. Supp. 528, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); 2 Loss,

op. cit. supra note 8, at 1067-68; Cook &Feldman, Insider Trading Under the
Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. REv. 612, 624 (1953); of. Heli-Coil Corp.
v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.N.J. 1963). However, a forced conversion
probably should not be treated as a sale of the preferred. See Ferraiolo v.
Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
13. See, e.g., Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Perlman v.
Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95
F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), af'd on opinion below, 190 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1951).

14. Ibid.
15. When dealing with options, there are three dates to be kept in mind:
(1) the date of acquisition of the option, (2) the date when the option is first
exercisable, and (3) the date when the option is actually exercised.
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pensation for service to the corporation."0 If cost is measured by
the value of the stock on the exercise date, the option holder
could sell immediately after exercise with no recoverable profit,
even though he may have used inside information to determine
when to exercise.1
If the option is exercised more than six months after it first
becomes exercisable, use of the Steinberg and Babbitt method to
determine the purchase price in computing the amount of recovery seems improper. SEC Rule X-16b-6's alleviates the hardship
imposed under Steinberg in the more extreme cases. It provides
that the purchase price of stock may be measured at "the lowest
market price of any security of the same class within 6 months
before or after the date of sale" when the option is exercised more
than six months after it was acquired." The rule is at best an
artificial solution; the cost it establishes is totally unrelated to
any actual transaction of the defendant. By implication it accepts
the extension of Steinberg under which the defendant is forced to
disgorge profits earned over more than six months2 0 - in contravention of the act itself. 21
It appears possible to treat an employee option as an equity
security2 2 and thereby achieve results more consistent with the
16. See Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Meeker
& Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider Liabilities Under
Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REV. 949, 968 (1959); 64 HARv. L. REv. 1378, 138081 (1951).
17. See Steinberg v. Sharpe, supra note 16, at 33-34.
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b- (1954).
19. As indicated in the instant case, 332 F.2d at 259, this rule is expressly
inapplicable if it leads to larger profits than would result in the absence of
the rule.
20.
We believe it inconsistent with . . . [the purpose of section 16(b)] ...
to include in the profits which the insider must surrender not only any
profits attributable to the short-swing, but profits which represent the
long term increment in value attributable to the possession of a right
to acquire stock.
S.E.C. Securities Act Release No. 4509, at 3-6 (1950). The Steinberg case was
pending when the rule was promulgated.
21. The rule has been upheld in Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217 F. Supp. 671
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1964); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100
F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). It has, however, been criticized as being outside
the Commissioner's authority to promulgate. See Hardee, Stock Options and
the "Insider Trading" Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, 65 HARv. L.
REv. 997, 1006 (1952); Note, 69 YALE LJ. 868, 881 (1960).
22. A contrary position has been taken but with little or no analysis in
2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1080-81; Cook & Feldman, supra note 12, at
624; Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate
Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468, 491-92 (1947).
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policy of the act?3 An option should qualify literally as a "warrant or right" to purchase a security; which is one portion of the
definition of an "equity security" in section 3(a)(11)?' In addition, the option holder may use inside information in determining
when to exercise just as profitably as he can use such information
in determining when to buy or sell the corporation's stock. Although the exercise of the option has no immediate effect on the
stockholding public, the use of inside information to determine
when to exercise enables the holder to maximize his personal
advantage vis-a-vis the corporation. Such action seems contrary
to the purposes of the act?5
If the option is treated as an equity security with the date first
exercisable viewed as the purchase date and the date exercised
as the date of sale, two separate holding periods arise for section
16(b) purposes. One is the period in which the exercisable option
is held, the other is the period in which the stock acquired through
exercise is held?' Convertible securities presumably would be so
23. See Hardee, supra note 21, at 1007-08. But see Cook & Feldman,
supra note 12, at 622-24; Meeker & Cooney, supra note 16, at 968.
24. 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(11) (1958). See Cook & Feldman, supra
note 12, at 392; Note, 59 YALE LJ. 510, 514 n.18 (1950); of. Note, 69
YALE L.J. 868, 873 (1960) (arguing that "puts" and "calls" were equity
securities). But cf. Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 223 F.
Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), which held that warrants and rights must
be negotiable, and must be issued by the corporation; these are characteristics which a "call" does not have. The negotiability requirement seems
too narrow an interpretation of the act. Moreover, an employee option
is issued by the corporation and thus is distinguishable from puts and calls.
Further, options seem to be certificates "of interest or participation in ...
a 'security'" and thus are "securities" within the act. Section 3(a)(10), 48
Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1958). Such a security is also an "equity
security" if it is "convertible, with or without consideration, into . .. [stock]."
Section 3(a)(11), 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(11) (1958).
At present Rule X-16b-3 exempts from section 16(b) liability a director's
or officer's acquisition of a qualified or restricted stock opinion. Before 1960,
the rule also applied to the stock acquired pursuant to the options, but this
provision was criticized in Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957), and
held invalid in Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), and
has since been deleted. The conclusion in Greene and Perlnman, that the rule
exceeded the SEC's authority, also should be applied to the option itself and
the present rule held invalid.
25. The Babbitt and Steinberg cases attempt to prevent the use of inside
information in connection with exercising an option by -basing the cost of
purchase of the common on the date when the option first became exercisable.
See note 23 supra and accompanying text. See also Greene v. Dietz, supra
note 24, at 693.
26. Cf. Note, 69 YALE L.J. 868, 876-90 (1960), suggesting a similar proposal for put and call transactions. Even if not persuasive as to puts and
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treated under the act? The similarities between options and
convertible securities would seem to justify identical treatment?8
The use of two separate short-swing periods maximizes recoverable profits while remaining within the six-months limitation of
the act. If, as in Babbitt, the option becomes exercisable, is exercised, and the common received is sold within a six-month period,
profits recovered are the same under either standard. When the
period between the date the option is first exercisable and the
date of exercise exceeds six months and the underlying securities
are then sold within six months of the exercise, the proposed
standard would limit recovery to the increase in the value of the
securities between exercise and sale. But if the option is exercised
within six months from the time it first becomes exercisable and
the stock is held for more than six months before sale, recovery
of the increase in value of the option from the exercisable to the
exercise date would be permitted under the proposed standard.
Constitutional Law: Right To Travel Abroad

Protected by First and Fifth Amendments
Appellants, top-ranking leaders of the Communist Party of
the United States,' had their passports revoked pursuant to
Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950? Section 6 made it a felony for members of communist organizations,
calls, the proposal should be applicable to the option transactions. See note
24 supra.
27, See notes 9 & 12 supra and accompanying text.
28. The value of the underlying common stock may determine the value
of either options or convertible securities. Exercise or conversion may be
accomplished at the holder's discretion. See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222
F. Supp. 831 (D.NJ. 1963), in which a corporate director who converted
debentures into common stock and later sold the stock was held liable for
profits both on the purchase and sale of the stock and on the receipt and
conversion of the debentures. Cf. Rubin & Feldman, supra note 2, at 492. See
also Meeker & Cooney, supra note 16, at 965. The fact that the option may
be nontransferable is not sufficient reason to distinguish the two. See note 24
supra.

1. Appellant Aptheker is editor of Political Affairs, the theoretical organ
of the party in this country and appellant Flynn is chairman of the party.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964).
2. Section 6 reads:
(a) When a Communist organization as defined in paragraph (5)
of section 3 [infra note 14] of this title is registered, or there is in effect
a final order of the Board requiring such organization to register, it
shall be unlawful for any member of such organization, with knowledge

